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Abstract: Modern trends in relay protection (RP) based on the substitution of 
electromechanical protection relays (EMPR) by digital protective relays (DPR) 
have resulted in the emergence of an absolutely new problem, which was not 
known before. This problem is the possibility of an intentional remote 
destructive impact (IRDI) on relay protection in order to put it out of action or 
make it perform functions that have nothing to do with the current operational 
mode of protected electric equipment. Traditional and well-known methods 
ensuring information safety cannot fully prevent unauthorized actions of RP. The 
article describes a new way for the problem solution. 
Keywords: Relay protection, Cyber attack, Digital protective relay, Intentional 
electromagnetic destructive impact, Cyber security. 
1 Introduction 
In the modern power systems, DPR is the most critical link [1], which on 
one hand is the most susceptible to IRDI, while on the other hand it is directly 
connected to a circuit breakers influencing the state of the power system. This is 
why the IRDI in the form of cyber attacks [2] and intentional electromagnetic 
destructive impact (EMDI) [3, 4] are aimed initially at DPRs.  
It is known that protection relay has two types of failures: the so called 
“non-operation” and the “unnecessary operation” (which in this context is 
similar to faulty operation). As mentioned in [1], the unnecessary (faulty) 
operation of RP can result in more significant damages than non-operation. This 
is due to the fact that non-operation of protection of a certain type is backed-up 
by protection of other types or more remote protection, such as protection on 
other levels, while the unnecessary operation of RP is almost impossible to 
prevent by available means. This idea is not something unexpected and has been 
mentioned before elsewhere [5]. At the same time, [1] mentions that this is an 
absolutely different situation, when an inadequately operating protection relay 
can generate a command for switching off a circuit breaker in the case of 
unnecessary operation and thus artificially prevent a power system from 
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functioning normally. This leads not only to the disconnection of thousands of 
consumers and considerable damage comparable to emergency mode in a power 
system, but also creates the danger of a serious blackout caused by sudden 
overflows of power in the case of disconnection in a branched energy supply 
system. As mentioned in [6] 25-28% of significant blackouts known in the 
world were the result of protection relay failures. If we admit that 50-70% of 
transition of an ordinary emergency mode to a serious blackout is also caused 
by protection relays [6], we can conclude that protection relay is responsible for 
all the blackouts. ORGRES representatives (Moscow) presented interesting 
data, which confirm the above mentioned idea [7]: 
In 2012 there were 53,214 events of actuation of protection relays and 
automatic equipment on Federal Grid Company’s equipment. This includes 
52,763 events (99,15%) of correct actuation; 451 events of incorrect 
actuations, which include 213 events of unnecessary actuation, 160 faulty 
actuations and 76 failures to actuate… 
The index of correct operation of DPR in 2012 was 98.97%, which is lower 
than the generalized index of correct operation of electromechanical 
protection relays (99.31%).   
First of all this means that the number of faulty and unnecessary actuations 
(373) under general operational conditions (i.e., without intentional remote 
destructive impacts) is much higher than the number of non-operation (76). 
Secondly, it suggests that the reliability of modern digital protection relays 
(DPR) is lower than that of old and worn-out electromechanical protection 
relays (EMPR).   
Special research conducted by the B5 committee of CIGRE and presented 
in its report confirmed the relevance of the problem and the conclusion that 
expansion of application of the most advanced standard IEC 61850 with its 
GOOSE-messages as well as modern Ethernet technologies in relay protection 
result in increasing its susceptibility to cyber attacks [8]. The appreciation of the 
problem of DPR’s cyber safety has resulted in intensification of multiple 
investigations in the area of cyber safety all over the world. For example, in the 
USA this situation is dealt with by a large department, which consists of several 
thousand people under the supervision of the Head of National Security Agency 
– General A. Keith [2], while in Russia this job is performed by a special 
department of the Federal Security Service of Russia. There are also Edicts of 
the President of the Russian Federation: “About establishment of a state system 
of detection, prevention and liquidation of consequences of computer attacks on 
informational resources of RF” and “The framework of state policy of RF in the 
area of international information security by 2020", which are viewed as a reply 
to the “International Strategy for Cyberspace” adopted by the USA in 2011 [9]. 
It is the first time that the USA sets computer subversions on a par with 
traditional military actions, reserving the right to react with all available means, Susceptibility of Modern Relay Protection: Will Protection From Cyber Attacks Help? 
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up to the use of nuclear weapons. It is known from the Mass Media that the 
problem of cyber security of the Israeli power system is handled by a special 
department of Israel Security Agency (SHABAK) together with specialists of 
the Israel Electric Company. In 2011 Israel launches National Cyber Command 
(The  National Cybernetic Taskforce) into Administration for the 
Development of Weapons and Technological Infrastructure (MAFAT) for 
coordination and concentration cyber R&D activities for the various branches of 
the Israeli defense establishment (cyber departments of Mossad, SHABAK, 
Ministry of Defense (Unit 8200) and other entitiesv) with budget of hundreds of 
millions of shekels in year. Recently, the major Russian Institute – All Russian 
Research and Development Institute of Relaying (VNIIR) – also established a 
special department, which is dealing with specific problems of cyber security of 
relay protection. According to Gartner, the volume of the international market 
of cyber security increased from 61.8 billion USD in 2012 to 67.2 billion USD 
in 2013. It is expected that it will reach 86 billion USD by 2016.  
2  What “Cyber Security” Means? 
This being said let us clarify what “cyber security” means? Analysis of 
several related publications shows that this term usually means informational 
security. It should be considered that “information security” may mean different 
things in different contexts, such meaning can be wider or narrower. The wider 
meaning includes the whole spectrum of organizational and technical measures 
of security provision. The types of information security are provisionally 
divided into passive and active. The passive risk of information security is 
aimed at illegal use of information resources and is not aimed at setting the 
information system out of order. This type of risk includes access to databases 
or listening through the data transfer channels. The active risk of information 
security is aimed at setting the information system out of order by an intentional 
attack on its components. The active threats of computer security include: 
physically knocking the computer out of operation or disturbance of its 
performance as well as intentional interference with the normal mode of 
operation of equipment controlled by the computer by interference with the 
algorithm of its operation. A typical example of the latter would be a well-
known virus called Stuxnet [2]. Under information security I will mean the 
ways of information protection from intentional or accidental unauthorized 
access, which can damage the normal course of data exchange in a system as 
well as stealing, modification and destruction of information.  
The major problems that need to be solved in the area of engineer-technical 
protection of information include: 
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– Interception of electronic emanation and electric signals;  
– Forced electromagnetic irradiation (lighting) of communication lines in 
order to obtain a parasitical modulation of the carrier; 
– Implementation of listening devices; 
– Remote photography; 
– Interception of acoustic irradiation and restoration of text sent to a printer; 
– The copying of information carriers, breaking through protection; 
– Impersonation; 
– Masking under system’s queries; 
– Use of software traps; 
– Use of drawbacks of programming languages and operating systems; 
– Unauthorized connection to hardware and communication lines of 
specific devices, which provide access to information; 
– Malicious setting of protection mechanisms out of order; 
– Deciphering of encrypted information by special software; 
– Informational infections, that is, different viruses, including “logical 
bombs”, “Trojans”, “worms”, “password interceptors”, etc. 
In order to ensure information security the following measures are usually 
implemented: 
1.  Firewall - a complex of hardware or software measures, which control 
and filter network packets flowing through it in accordance with 
established rules. This means enables: 
– Filtering access to initially unprotected services; 
– Prevent obtaining closed information from protected sub-network 
as well as intrusion into a protected sub-network of faulty data by 
means of susceptible services; 
– Control access to network nodes; 
– Registering all access attempts both from external and from 
internal networks; 
– Regulating the order of access to the network; 
– Notification of suspicious activity, flexing or attacks to network 
nodes or the firewall itself. 
2.  Antivirus software developed to locate computer viruses as well as 
malicious software and restore the infected (modified) files and to 
prevent infecting files and/or the operating system. Location of viruses 
is usually based on comparison of codes browsed by the antivirus with 
the known codes (signature) of malicious software set up in the library 
of the antivirus. Recently the so called pro-active technologies of 
antivirus protection have started to develop. The idea behind them is 
that unlike reactive (signature-based) technologies they prevent 
infection of the system rather than searching for malicious software in 
the system.  Susceptibility of Modern Relay Protection: Will Protection From Cyber Attacks Help? 
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3.  Cryptographic methods of protection of information, in other words 
coding and encryption of information, access keys, special protocols of 
network and user authentification.  
These widely known technical measures can be supplemented by some 
specific measures accepted in digital relay protection. One of these measures is 
a use of general information data buses (process buses) since the attack on such 
a bus is the simplest and the most efficient way, which can interfere with 
operation of a substation. It is possible to use several “point-to-point” links 
instead of these buses. This will allow using commutation protocols (including 
one-way data transfer), which are more resistant to attacks. These and many 
other specific measures of RP protection, which have more to do with 
protection of data transfer protocols, increasing of password cryptographic 
robustness, etc., are discussed in more details in [10].  
3  Are Widely Known Measures of Information Security Enough to 
Ensure Reliable Operation of Digital Protective Relays? 
The main question now is: are all of these widely known measures of 
information security enough to ensure reliable operation of digital protection 
relay? My answer is – no. Traditional and well known methods ensuring 
information safety cannot fully prevent unauthorized actions of RP. It doesn’t 
mean that some methods of protection are not efficient enough yet (which is 
actually the case), but it means that it is not possible in principal. The analysis 
discussed above suggests that all the known technical measures of protection of 
information are designed to protect information channels from unauthorized 
access and information itself from being stolen and/or damaged. Of course, 
these information channels are widely used in digital RP and they should 
definitely be protected very well. But here’s the question: are these channels the 
only way to make DPR disconnect the circuit breakers and ruin the circuit? In 
point of fact DPR contains a lot of so called “logical inputs” (LI) that are 
sensitive to voltage availability. This voltage is delivered to LI by means of 
contacts of external electromechanical relays. It is not possible to encrypt or 
encode the fact of voltage presence or absence on the LI. Moreover, the LI’s 
design in a DPR is not suitable to receive encoded information. It is enough to 
modify the freely-programmable logics of DPR so that during a remote supply 
of voltage by means of a certain external relay to a previously selected LI there 
will be actuation of output DPR relays affecting the circuit breakers and it will 
be possible to use it to sabotage the power system. Unfortunately, none of the 
above measures of protection from cyber attacks will help in this situation, since 
in actuality there was no cyber attack to DPR. Considering the fact that besides 
the above impacts powerful direct ultra-broadband radio waves or a powerful 
electromagnetic impulse can tamper with the DPR [3, 4], I think we should V. Gurevich 
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avoid using the term “cyber attack” and use the “intentional remote destructive 
impact” (IRDI) instead. This will include all types of intentional destructive 
impacts on relay protection. I think that this transition is rather substantiated, 
since the technical solutions that I offer result in efficient protection of DPR 
from all types of such impacts simultaneously.   
So, what do I offer to reduce susceptibility of DPR to IRDI? 
4  The New Way for Increasing Reliability of Relay Protection 
As we mentioned before, the task of increasing reliability of relay 
protection cannot be fulfilled by combining DPR’s functions with those that 
have nothing to do with relay protection, such as monitoring the functionality of 
electric equipment, remote control of circuit breakers, etc.  The DPR should be 
used solely to solve the problems of relay protection. Moreover, there are many 
specific devices on the market that can be used to solve other problems, such as 
monitoring the electric equipment. These devices may vary from the simplest 
relays that control the circuit breaker trip coil circuit to sophisticated complex 
units that ensure online control of gas composition dissolved in the 
transformer’s oil or the level of partial discharges in the insulating material. I 
think that remote control of circuit breakers should also be separated from DPR 
and should be performed by separate hardware rather than by DPR. This is the 
only way we can increase the reliability of RP and efficiently protect it from 
intentional remote destructive impacts. This separation of functions not only 
ensures efficient protection of DPR, Fig. 1, but also employs a remote system of 
circuit breakers control [11]. 
The general idea behind the suggested hardware-facilitated method of 
protecting DPR from IRDI is to use an electromechanical reed-switch operated 
actuator in combination with DPR and connected in series with it as well as a 
responsive electromechanical starting unit - SU (RR1 – RR4), which ensures 
blocking the sensitive terminals of DPR and disconnection of its output circuit, 
Fig. 1. The reset of the actuated SU is performed upon the circuit breaker’s 
actuation and backed-up by a RESET command at the end of a preliminary set-
up time period. 
Without current and/or voltage actuation of this SU, DPR will not be able 
to influence the operation mode of the power system, even under IRDI or a 
powerful electromagnetic interference impact. If the SU is actuated and DPR is 
enabled, nothing will interfere with using specific features and wide functional 
capabilities of DPR. At the same time unnecessary actuation of the SU itself 
does not influence the operation of relay protection and thus there are no 
specific requirements to the accuracy of SU actuation. The only thing that is 
important that it should always be actuated before DPR, i.e. it’s settings should 
be a little bit lower than required for the controlled parameter. If the AE Susceptibility of Modern Relay Protection: Will Protection From Cyber Attacks Help? 
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actuation was unnecessary and DPR was not actuated, the device would 
automatically reset. The main technical requirements to this device are its high 
reliability, insensitivity to short impulse (micro- and nanosecond range) and 
high-frequency interferences, resistance to substantial overloads, high level of 
galvanic separation from external circuits and high speed of response to 
actuation (several milliseconds).  
 
Fig. 1 – Structural Diagram of DPR Protection from IRDI. 
 
The principle of operation of this device is as follows. In its initial state 
under the normal operation mode of the protected object, all the input reed-
switches (current and voltage sensors, etc) of the SU are in released state; the 
coils of the control reed-switches RR1-RR4 are not powered. The normally 
closed contacts RR1 and RR2 are short circuited the logical inputs of DPR, the 
RR3 terminals are short circuited the communication channel, while the RR4 
terminals are breaking the output circuit of DPR. Under these conditions the 
DPR is fully blocked both in inputs and in outputs and neither IRDI can result 
in its unnecessary actuation and unauthorized turn on of CB trip coil. By-
passing of logical inputs of both DPR and communication channel increase its 
operational life under the impact of a powerful electromagnetic impulse.   V. Gurevich 
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In case of emergency mode in the protected object at least one of the 
controlled parameters (current, voltage or power) will drastically change. This 
change leads to actuation of at least one of the reed-switches of the SU within 
1  ms or less and to further actuation of RR1-RR4 relays (turn off of reed-
switches) takes place during 2–4 ms, while closing of powerful terminals of 
RR4 reed-switch on a Bestact R15U reed-switch type doesn’t take longer than 5 
milliseconds. Thus, the total response time of the unit to an emergency mode 
does not exceed 6 ms, which is rather acceptable considering the DPR’s own 
actuation time of 30–40 ms. Under this mode of operation of DPR protection 
device, the DPR will be fully unblocked and returned into its normal mode of 
operation, retaining all its settings and features 
The selection of reed-switches as basic elements of the device is based on 
the aggregate of their most important features, such as: air tightness, long life, 
high responsiveness, special gas environment or vacuum, where contact 
elements are located, no need to adjust or clean the terminals, high level of 
galvanic separation between the input (control coil) and output (reed-switch), as 
well as clear and consistent actuation threshold (pickup). I developed the current 
and voltage sensors with adjustable pickups on reed-switches long ago and were 
widely used in special hardware and military equipment. There is a description 
of some of them in [12], which can be used in the device described above. All 
the elements of the device can be mounted in a separate module supplied by 
DPR manufacturers and located close to DPR in a relay cabinet. 
5 Conclusion 
1.  Cyber attacks are not the only threat to modern digital protection relay. 
This is why in order to improve reliability of relay protection 
conventional methods ensuring information security are not enough. 
2.  Instead of “cyber attack” it is suggested using the term: “intentional 
remote destructive impact” (IRDI). This will include all types of 
intentional destructive impacts on relay protection. Targeted at 
unauthorized interference with its operation, disturbance of its normal 
algorithm of operation or setting it out of order.  
3.  The known methods ensuring information security are not able to 
protect DPR from IRDI. Thus, it is necessary to develop absolutely new 
means of DPR protection, which will supplement the methods ensuring 
information security. 
4.  As a universal means of DPR protection from IRDI it is proposed using 
a separate module, containing an actuating element with responsive 
electromechanical current and voltage sensors with reed-switches and 
output control reed-switch relays, which would unblock the logical Susceptibility of Modern Relay Protection: Will Protection From Cyber Attacks Help? 
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outputs of DPR, its output circuits and the communication channel only 
in case of emergency or an event close to emergency in a protected unit.  
5.  In order to benefit from DPR protection from IRDI it is necessary to 
stop the malpractice of supplementing DPR with additional functions, 
which have nothing to do with RP; limit the scale of programmable 
logic use as well as separate functions designed for the remote control 
of CB and the relay protection, considering an independent and 
protected system for remote control of CB. 
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